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September 2019 set yet another record 
for the lowest ice extent at the Arctic 
Ocean1. This record reaffirms the 
worsening of the ongoing 
environmental and ecological challenges 
that the Arctic has been increasingly 
facing due to the loss of sea ice. 
However, the more sea ice disappears, 
the more the Arctic Ocean opens up, 
thus creating easier maritime access, 
which results in increased human 
activities. Apparently, in addition to 
natural resources exploitation, one clear 
indicator of human activity is 
international trade through the greater 
volume of maritime traffic at the 
Northern Sea Route. Therefore, one of 
the obvious Arctic realities is the gradual 
increase in maritime shipping. The 
adverse effect of human activities 
further accelerates the threats to the 
Arctic environment. Arctic biodiversity, 
natural resources, and the identities and 
cultures of local inhabitants, including 
diverse groups of indigenous peoples, 
are particularly vulnerable to these new 
developments. They face existential 
threats. Hence, fighting climate change 
and its consequences to the Arctic 
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environment are repeatedly articulated 
in any discussions on the governing of 
the region.  
The main legal challenge in the Arctic 
therefore lies in a possible structure of 
governance that is capable of responding 
to the threat to its natural environment. 
Obviously, ice melting due to the effect 
of global warming has been and is the 
major issue in the Arctic. Law cannot ban 
a natural course of action, e.g. sea ice 
melt. Instead, law prescribes how to 
regulate human behaviour in a certain 
direction to achieve certain goals. The 
reduction of atmospheric greenhouse 
gas emissions is a goal set by 
international climate change law. For 
almost the last three decades, the 
international community has continued 
to set a limit for sovereign nations to 
agree on the permissible level of 
emissions. International climate change 
law even provides various flexible 
mechanisms for industrialised nations, 
e.g. clean development mechanisms, to 
possibly meet the overall global 
collective target for lowering the 
atmospheric emission levels. However, a 
(states’) consent-based international 
legal framework hardly offers a 
mechanism to make reluctant nations 
join the efforts to strictly follow and 
regulate emission levels. Major powers 
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such as the United States present their 
explicit disagreement on the issue of 
reducing emissions. US President 
Donald Trump even opposes efforts to 
limit climate change, both in national 
and international contexts2. 
The Arctic Council’s Ministerial 
meeting, held in May 2019 at Rovaniemi 
in Finland, once again reflected the US’ 
position. For the first time in the twenty-
three–year history of the Arctic Council, 
a ministerial meeting ended with no 
joint declaration being adopted due to 
the US’ reluctance about the use of 
language concerning combatting climate 
change. According to Mike Pompeo, the 
US Secretary of the State, ‛Collective 
goals, even when well-intentioned, are 
not always the answer. They are 
rendered meaningless, even 
counterproductive, as soon as one nation 
fails to comply’3. In the Arctic Council 
meeting, the US is in fact the ‛one nation’ 
that took a position against that of the 
other seven Arctic nations. This 
difference in position has brought some 
disappointment to the efforts of the 
Arctic Council to fight climate change 
and the future of sustainable Arctic 
development. Some analysts explained 
that the lack of unanimity on the 
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substantial issue of climate change in the 
Arctic Council meeting will weaken the 
future of Arctic cooperation within the 
framework of the Arctic Council—a 
cooperation that has proved effective 
over the past years.  
Much of the heated debate with the US 
at and around this time was about the 
increasing presence of non-Arctic states 
in the Arctic cooperation, particularly 
the increasing presence of China. The US 
(as Pompeo stated) views China’s 
increasing presence in the Arctic as ‛an 
arena of global power and competition’. 
He referred to the Polar Silk Road, which 
is an expansion of China’s Belt and Road 
initiative to the Arctic. The US sees 
China’s increased bi-lateral relationship 
with Russia and investment in 
infrastructure development in the Arctic 
as the expansion of its strategic move 
into the region, which the US is 
concerned about. According to Pompeo, 
this move would make the ‛Arctic Ocean 
to transform into a new South China 
Sea’4. China’s visibility in the Arctic in 
recent years has indeed been explicit, 
exemplified by a number of factors, 
including its gaining of observer status 
at the Arctic Council in 2013; regular 
scientific expeditions to the Arctic since 
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2012; ownership of yet another ice-
breaker vessel (the first domestically 
built one) for polar expeditions—the 
Snow Dragon II; increased bi-lateral trade 
and economic cooperation with Russia; 
investment in infrastructure 
development, in particular in the 
Russian Arctic; increased investments in 
mining and mineral sectors in 
Greenland; entering a free trade 
agreement with Iceland since 2013; and 
joining in the efforts to build an Arctic 
railroad to provide a transport corridor.  
However, this author believes that 
China’s increasing Arctic engagement 
will not give the country any special 
legal claims. Firstly, the rules of 
international law are clear enough in the 
Arctic. As with any other state, China 
has a right to freedom of navigation as 
long as it complies with the provisions 
set by the law of the sea, particularly the 
UNCLOS. As a result, international law 
does not deny China’s maritime access 
to the Arctic. Secondly, China has 
expressed its clear commitment to abide 
by the sovereignty of the Arctic states 
and to the core values these states held 
in the Arctic when it joined the Arctic 
Council as an observer. This 
commitment was reiterated in its white 
paper on the Arctic that it adopted in 
early 2018, which eventually means that 
China would not act contrary to what 
sovereignty entails for the Arctic states. 
Thirdly, in its white paper, China stated 
its intention to join the efforts to combat 
climate change in the Arctic, recognising 
its widespread consequences not only 
within, but also beyond, the Arctic. In 
this context, China, alongside its 
regional cooperation arrangements 
(such as with the Arctic states through 
the efforts of the Arctic Council) also 
highlights the efforts undertaken within 
the framework of the United Nations. 
Fourthly, China’s participation in the 
Arctic’s legal development, such as in 
the adoption of the Polar Code and the 
Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries 
Agreement, reflects its commitments to 
work with nations within and beyond 
the region. None of these threatens the 
international Arctic legal framework. 
However, China’s increasing strength in 
the global economy, investments in the 
Arctic, and expansion of the current BRI 
project to the Arctic (through the Polar 
Silk Road) will probably put the country 
in a better negotiating position in any 
Arctic developments. Yet, Pompeo’s 
claim of making the Arctic Ocean ‛a new 
South China Sea’ is not justified.  
Rather, recent discussions of the US’ 
interest in buying Greenland have 
caused some concerns and also some 
questions about whether international 
law allows a sovereign territory or a part 
of a sovereign territory to be bought or 
sold. The status of Greenland is 
relatively unique. It is an island over 
which Denmark exercises sovereignty. It 
has self-government status with its own 
parliament and thus has the authority to 
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decide on all domestic matters except for 
foreign and security policy. The island, 
with a population of 56,000 residents, is 
financed through a budget consisting of 
a two-thirds share from Denmark and 
the rest mainly from fishing activity. 
Immediately after the US’ expression of 
interest in the possibility of buying the 
island, the Danish government 
denounced any such likelihood, saying 
Greenland ‛is not for sale’5. Recently, in 
the Arctic Circle Assembly held on 10–13 
October 2019, US Senator Lisa 
Murkowski, in response to a question on 
this issue, denounced the possibility of 
buying a whole nation6. However, it has 
not been uncommon in the past to buy or 
sell a whole territory. We are aware of 
Russia’s sale of Alaska to the US in 1867 
for 7.2 million dollars because Russia 
thought at that time the territory was 
worthless land. At earlier times, such 
selling and buying were done, and 
thereby the territorial borders of 
countries were reshaped, but to what 
extent this practice is now valid remains 
to be examined. Buying or selling 
territory has not so far become an 
established practice in international law. 
However, we are also aware that there is 
an active market for proprietary interests 
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in public lands, such as the Chinese 
state-run Heilongjiang Beidahuang 
Nongken Group’s purchase of 800,000 
acres of Argentinian land to grow crops 
for export to China or South Korea’s 
Daewoo Logistics’ lease of 3.2 million 
acres of farmland in Madagascar7. Yet, 
selling these lands clearly does not have 
any effect on national sovereignty.  
Despite all these tensions, there are 
indeed some reasons for optimism about 
Arctic legal developments. Last August, 
the US became the fourth party to ratify 
the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated 
High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic 
Ocean8. The agreement was signed 
earlier in 2018 by ten signatories, 
including all five Arctic coastal states 
plus four non-Arctic states (China, 
Japan, Korea, and Singapore) and the 
European Union. Given that in the 
summer the ice-free Arctic Ocean would 
allow access to fishing, this agreement is 
a legally binding treaty implementing a 
precautionary approach to protect the 
central Arctic Ocean from commercial 
fishing, which the major fishing nations, 
including non-Arctic ones, came to by 
consensus. This is promising and 
eventually is likely to set the standard 
for non-parties to comply with the 
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normative principles embodied in the 
agreement.  
However, a major disappointment for 
non-Arctic states is the third legally 
binding instrument adopted under the 
auspices of the Arctic Council—the 
Agreement on Enhancing International 
Arctic Scientific Cooperation, signed in 
May 2017 and entered into force on 23 
May 2018. While the purpose of the 
agreement was to reduce obstacles to 
international scientific cooperation and 
to promote the movement of people and 
equipment across borders for the 
effective and efficient development of 
scientific knowledge of the Arctic, it does 
not apply to the non-Arctic states even 
when they cooperate with one or 
another of the eight-member states of the 
Arctic Council. It has been argued that 
non-Arctic states ‛are left behind at the 
original legal situation and trapped in an 
inferior status in Arctic science’,9 and 
therefore, an avenue to provide at least 
those with competitive research abilities 
access to enjoying similar treatment is a 
demand from the non-Arctic states. For 
an inclusive Arctic governance 
framework, Arctic states might consider 
a possible amendment to the agreement, 
similar to the one we witnessed for the 
Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries 
Agreement.  
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On the human rights front, even though 
the Arctic is populated by four million 
people, and 90% of the population are 
non-indigenous, most discussions 
concern issues related to indigenous 
peoples. During the last year, one of the 
main issues has been the Arctic railroad 
project, which has caused tension among 
the Sámi communities, particularly in 
Finland. The railroad will connect the 
Arctic Ocean by linking Kirkenes 
(Norway) to Rovaniemi (Finland). The 
impact of the project will surely fall 
upon the Sámi and their reindeer 
herding practices. Reindeer herding is 
an emblem to the Sámi. Given that the 
vast territory is used as grazing lands for 
reindeer herding, construction of the 
railroad will create an obstacle because 
access to grazing land will be limited. 
Moreover, possible noise from the 
construction and subsequent operation 
will force the relocation of the reindeer. 
The Sámi’s rights concerning the 
practice of culture are expected to be 
vulnerable, which eventually will 
constitute yet another threat to the 
maintenance of their exercise of a right to 
self-determination given that the process 
has not ensured their engagement at its 
initial phase. According to the president 
of the Sámi Parliament, they were not 
aware of the plan until they heard about 
it on a media channel in the summer of 
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201710. This process has caused 
disappointment to the Sámi because 
their rights to be informed, to participate 
and to be consulted were ignored during 
the planning process.  
During late September 2019, the Saami 
Council—an organisation representing 
all four Sámi-inhabited countries and a 
permanent participant in the Arctic 
Council—adopted a new Arctic Sámi 
Strategy11 highlighting the measures for 
a meaningful and effective engagement 
of the Sámi in all aspects of political, 
diplomatic, cultural, educational and 
policy-making processes. The strategy 
suggests that the Sámi have to have an 
influential role, in addition to political 
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participation, to help set agendas based 
on their own strategy and priorities 
through partnership, education, and 
advocacy. The strategy, as 
communicated through various 
influential channels to national and 
transnational authorities, explicitly set 
standards and principles that the Sámi 
expect states to observe. Given that a 
right to self-determination for 
indigenous peoples is about the 
promotion of meaningful and effective 
inclusiveness and partnership in the 
process of democratic governance, the 
strategy set yet another milestone for the 
exercise of a right to indigenous self-
determination. 
